"Non-discriminatory

Means "most-favoured \(\) nation treatment" and "national treatment" (no less favourable than treatment of third country undertakings/ own undertakings) and treatment no less favourable than treatment of any other comparable entity.

Article ENER 2(2)

Market principles

SO System operation TSO Transmission system operator CRM Capacity remuneration mechanism

TPA Third party access RES-E Energy from renewable sources

SoS Security of supply DA/ID Day-ahead/intraday BZ. Bidding zone

NI remains part of the SEM and the IEM - as far as wholesale markets are concerned - by virtue of the NI protocol in the withdrawal agreement

Support for RES-E

Each party must promote energy efficiency and the use of RES-E.

Each party must ensure that support for RES-E facilitates the integration of RES-E into the market.

Subsidies for RES-E and CRMs must not underline competitive markets, or efficient use of interconnectors and should preferably be determined by competitive process.

Article ENER.22(1); Annex ENER-2



Each party must ensure that regulatory framework for electricity is non-

Retail customers must be free to choose and switch suppliers.

Parties may regulate for legitimate public policy goals based on objective and non-discriminatory criteria.

Parties may regulate consumer prices only for public policy reasons, and any regulated price must be clearly defined, transparent, non-discriminatory and proportionate.



Wholesale markets

Wholesale market rules must:

- encourage free price formation and not set technical limits on pricing that restrict trade:
- enable efficient dispatch, storage, DSR and system use; and
- enable integration of RES-E and efficient and secure system operation.
- Reflects elements of Articles 3(b), (f)

Balancing markets

Must ensure:

- non-discriminatory participation and access;
- transparent definition and markethased procurement of balancing services; and reasonable non-discriminatory terms for
- procurement of products and services by RES-E producers.
- Reflects elements of Article 6(1) of Reg 043

Must be clearly defined, transparent, Λ proportionate and non-discriminatory. Neither party required to permit crossborder participation in CRMs.

Reg 943; also CRM need not be last

Third party access

Each party must ensure TPA within reasonable period of request (except where insufficient capacity), based on published tariffs, cost-reflective and transparent connection/reinforcement charges

etc and other necessary info, applied objectively and in a non-discriminatory manner.

Reflects Article 6 of Dir 944

unbundling

Each party must ensure that TSOs carry out functions in a transparent.

Each party to implement effective unbundling arrangements.

Cf. Articles 40 and 41 of

Exemptions only where necessary for legitimate public policy objective and based

- from TPA and unbundling for emergent or isolated markets or systems;
- · from rules on competition and wholesale markets for small or isolated markets or systems; and
- from TPA and unbundling for infrastructure meeting the conditions set out in Annex ENER-3 (new/significantly expanded infrastructure, risk of no investment without exemption, enhances competition or SoS, legal separation from TSO, capacity rules decided in advance).
- Rules for infrastructure reflect Article 63(1)(a) to (c) and (4), 4th indent, of Reg 943 (which apply only to interconnectors)

Exemptions previously granted under Article 63 of Reg 943 will continue to apply.

Each party to designate and maintain independent regulator(s) with powers and

- · fix or approve network tariffs and charges:
- ensure compliance with rules on unbundling and derogations; and
- issue binding decisions and impose effective remedies.

Market integrity

Each party must prohibit market manipulation and insider trading on wholesale markets.

Each party must monitor trading. The parties must cooperate in detection and prevention, and may exchange information including on monitoring and enforcement.

 Definition of wholesale derivatives or transport.

GB will continue to apply REMIT (and



With the aim of ensuring the efficient use of interconnectors and reducing barriers to trade between UK and EU, each party must

- capacity allocation and congestion management are marketbased, transparent and non-discriminatory; info on capacity calculation is published:
- maximum capacity is made available, respecting secure SO and efficient system use;
- curtailment only in emergency situations and in a non-discriminatory manner;
- no network charges on individual transactions, and no reserve prices for the use of interconnectors;
- capacity allocation and congestion management is coordinated between EU and UK TSOs across forward DA ID and balancing timeframes; and UK TSOs will not participate in EU capacity/
- congestion procedures (under FCA, CACM and EB GLs). i Reg 943)

Inter-TSO compensation for XB flows

EU and UK must conclude asap an agreement that in effect extends ITC mechanism to UK TSOs, ensuring equivalent but not more favourable treatment.

Until agreement is concluded, transmission use fee may be charged on scheduled imports and exports between EU and UK.

Specialised Committee on Energy will ensure that TSOs develop technical procedures for DA trading. It may take decisions/recommendations itself if it doesn't recommend implementation of TSOs' proposals.

DA trading to be based on multi-region loose volume coupling. calculating net positions between UK and directly connected BZs (SEM. FR. BE, NL) using the following inputs

- commercial DA bids/offers from UK and SEM, FR, BE, NL;
- · network capacity data, under agreed procedures;
- data on expected commercial flows between SEM, FR, BE, NL and other EU BZs, as determined by EU TSOs; and
- DC interconnector characteristics, including losses and ramping

Market coupling function will provide reliable and repeatable results in time to use as inputs into each party's DA markets, using distinct and separate algorithm from the algorithm used under CACM, and using only bids and offers from directly connected EU BZs.

Procedures will include a fall-back process.

Timetable:

- CBA and outline proposals within 3 months;
- proposals for technical procedures within 10 months; and
- entry into operation within 15 months.

Specialised Committee on Energy may recommend that TSOs prepare technical procedures for other timeframes.

Article ENER.14 and Annex ENER-4











Cooperation

Representatives of each party. Monitors implementation and functioning, adopts decisions, exchanges information.

Cooperation on network development

The parties must cooperate on development of infrastructure connecting their territories. Network development plans must be drawn up, published and updated.

The parties must cooperate on security of supply, preparing and exchanging plans and information on risk preparedness and emergencies. They must inform each other of threatened or actual disruptions or other crises, with a view to possible coordinated mitigation and restoration measures. They must share best practices on adequacy assessments. They must develop frameworks for

Risk preparedness plans must be established and regularly updated, and must contain transparent, non-discriminatory etc measures to reduce likelihood and impact of risks.

Non-market based measures may be used only as a last resort.

Cooperation between TSOs

TSOs must develop working arrangements. Where recommended by the Specialised Committee on Energy, these arrangements must include technical procedures to implement arrangements for:

Efficient use of interconnectors Network development Electricity trading

Working arrangements between TSOs must also include frameworks for cooperation between ENTSO-E and UK TSOs for:

Network access Efficient use of interconnectors Infrastructure planning Specialised Committee on Energy must agree guidance on

working arrangements and frameworks for cooperation asap. UK TSOs will not be members, or have status comparable to membership, of ENTSO-E.

TSOs may be asked to prepare draft of the technical procedures.

TSOs must obtain opinion of ACER (for EU) and UK regulators (for UK) on proposed technical procedures.

Specialised Committee will review draft procedures and may recommend implementation.

ACER and UK regulators must develop contacts and enter into arrangements covering at least:

Efficient use of Infrastructure Security of Cooperation hetween TSOs interconnectors nlanning Market abuse Network access Markets

UK regulator will not be a member or have status comparable to membership of ACER.

Cooperation in offshore RES-E

The parties will cooperate in the development of offshore RES-E and will create a forum for technical discussions

between governments, regulators, TSOs and stakeholders, on: Hybrid/joint projects Maritime spatial planning Support and finance Grid planning New technologies Best practice on regulation



Security of supply











