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Reported Trade Mark Cases October 2007
21-11-2007
Katharine Stephens and Zoe Fuller
Important - The information in this article is provided subject to the disclaimer. The law may have changed since first publication and the reader is cautioned accordingly.
Ref no. | Application (and where applicable, earlier mark) | Comment | O/250/06 Red Letter Days Plc v Redenvelope Inc 29.08.06 | REDENVELOPE RED ENVELOPE 
- various advertising; business and online services (35) - website & website design (42) 
- cameras, sunglasses (9); jewellery (14); printed matter (16); accessories (18); dinnerware (21) lanyards (22); clothing (25); badges (26); alcoholic beverages (33); insurance services (36); travel and delivery services (39); entertainment services (41); web site design services (42) | The appeal by Red Letter Days Plc against the Hearing Officer’s decision not to allow the opposition was on the basis that the Hearing Officer (a) incorrectly assessed Red Letter Days Plc’s evidence and/or (b) failed to take note of, or gave insufficient weight to, persuasive evidence before him. Red Letter Days Plc’s request to introduce additional evidence was refused as no substantial explanation was given for its last minute submission and the significance of the evidence was unconvincing. Professor Ruth Annand held that the Hearing Officer did not err in finding that Red Letter Days Plc had failed to establish a reputation for RED LETTER for the registered goods/services in the UK (although it had succeeded in establishing a reputation in RED LETTER DAYS for activity days out). The Hearing Office was correct to have regard solely to the inherent distinctiveness of RED LETTER in assessing likelihood of confusion for Section 5(2)(b) and the appeal under this ground was dismissed. The appeals under Sections 5(3) and 5(4)(a) were also dismissed. Red Letter Days Plc’s request to refer questions to the ECJ regarding material date for the purposes of Section 5(4)(a) was refused. | O/255/06 Ian Fleming Publications Limited v Danjag LLC (08.09.06) | YOUNG BOND - goods and services in classes 9, 16, 25, 28, 38 and 41. | IFPL’s appeal against the Hearing Officer’s interlocutory decision to grant an extension of time to Danjaq to file evidence in support of the opposition was dismissed. IFPL submitted (a) that the Hearing Officer erred in taking account of reasons advanced orally for the first time at the hearing; those reasons constituted a new request for an extension of time; and (b) that the reasons put forward were insufficient to support an extension of time. Professor Ruth Annand held that the Hearing officer was neither unreasonable nor plainly wrong in granting Danjaq the extension. Following Ministry of Sound Recordings Limited’s Application, BL O/136/03, the Appointed Person held that, although it is highly desirable that all reasons sought to be relied on in support of an extension of time should be in writing in advance of a hearing, that does not preclude the Hearing Officer from taking into account other reasons put forward orally at the hearing when deciding whether to exercise his discretion. | O/262/06 Nirvana Spa & Leisure Ltd v Gail Boura & Clive Boura (18.09.06) | NIRVANA - Perfumes, perfumed soap, toilet articles; body sprays; soaps; perfumes; essential oils; cosmetics; non-medicated toilet preparations; preparations for the hair; dentifrices; anti-perspirants; deodorants for use on the person; skin care preparations (3) | Nirvana Spa & Leisure Ltd applied to revoke the registrations of the trade mark NIRVANA for non-use pursuant to Section 46(1)(b). The Hearing Officer revoked the registration save to the extent the registrations covered 'hair care preparations; moisturisers; shower and bath preparations; shaving; make-up removers". Nirvana Spa & Leisure Ltd appealed the decision. The Hearing Officer's finding that the mark used by the proprietor was NIRVANA NATURAL (rather than NIRVANA) was not challenged. Richard Arnold QC held that the Hearing Officer had not made any error in principle in concluding that the addition of the work NATURAL did not alter the distinctive character of the trade mark NIRVANA (as the word NATURAL was descriptive and lacking in distinctive character), although the Appointed Person noted that the case was close to the line and another Hearing Officer may have concluded differently. The Appointed Person further held that the restriction of the specification to particular goods was a reasonable decision although he noted that in some cases it might be useful for the Hearing Officer to invite further submissions from the parties as to the framing of the specification. The appeal was dismissed. | O/333/06 Henkel KgaA v The Football Association Ltd (10.11.06) | 
- Various goods in a range of classes Fa - Various goods in classes 3, 5 and 21 | Geoffrey Hobbs QC agreed with the Hearing Officer and dismissed the opposition. Henkel KgaA submitted that the Hearing Officer had erred by giving insufficient weight to the degree of visual and phonetic similarity between ‘The FA’ and ‘Fa’ when assessing the likelihood of confusion under Section 5(2)(b). Following Medio AG v Thomson Multimedia Sales Germany & Austria GmbH C-120/04, the Appointed Person held that the similarities between the marks in issue are so slight and the differences so great that, even where there is direct overlap between the goods of the rival specifications, the mark could be used concurrently in the course of trade in the UK without giving rise to the existence for a likelihood of confusion. It is only by ignoring the visual, aural and conceptual differences between the presentation of the letters ‘F’ and ‘A’ and adopting the essentially robotic approach of a search engine that is possible to bring the marks into conflict at all. | O/328/06 Look C Ltd v Apple Projects Ltd (13.11.06) |
 - apparatus for recording, transmission and reproduction of sound or images; computer hardware; computer software; but not including software relating to movie stars’ (9)
| The Hearing Officer applied the provisions of Section 46(5) and held that the registration of the trade mark should be limited to 'computer hardware; computer software interconnection leads for use therewith; but not including software relating to movie stars'; registration of all other goods were revoked for non-use. Geoffrey Hobbs Q.C. held that this was an over-simplification; the Hearing Officer should not have been deflected from deciding the wording of the specification by 'what Apple has chosen' in its own interests to prefer. The Appointed Person revised the specification of goods to reflect the proprietor's area of trading activity realistically and fairly. | O/329/06 Olympus Kabushiki Kaisha v Ajit Kumar (14.11.06) |
 - (35)
| Olympus filed an appeal to the Appointed Person against the Hearing Officer’s decision to reject its opposition. Olympus subsequently filed an Appellants Notice at the High Court (out of time, however, its request for an extension of time was granted). Olympus’s evidence was that the appeal was mistakenly filed in the Trade Marks Registry rather than the Court, however, the company did not formally withdraw the appeal to the Appointed Person. In order to ascertain whether any further action was needed on his part, Geoffrey Hobbs QC directed Olympus to state in writing whether and when its appeal to the Appointed Person would be withdrawn. | O/334/06 Ratiopharm GMBH v Astrazeneca AB (22.11.06) | FELENDIL Felendil - (5) | During the opposition, Astrazeneca made applications to the Registry to amend its pleadings to include a Section 3(6) objection and an order for cross-examination of Ratiopharm's witness. The Hearing Officer refused both requests and stated that if either party wished to appeal the decision they should file a Form TM5 requesting reasons for the decision within one month. Astrazenca did not file a Form TM5; and instead appealed to the Appointed Person and included a request for an extension of time. In refusing the applications, Geoffrey Hobbs QC held that the inherent and implied powers of a statutory tribunal are interstitial and can be exercised only in accordance within the latitude allowed by the express statutory provisions. The role of an Appointed Person under Section 76 is to consider the correctness or otherwise of decisions made by the Registrar and not to authorise anyone to proceed in a way which does not comply with the specific requirements of the statutory provisions. | O/339/06 Mr Michael Charles White v Atota Communications Ltd (29.11.06) | ATOTA - (3, 6, 9, 14, 16, 20, 24, 25, 28, 35, 38, 41, 42) | Prior to the dissolution of the company Atota Ltd, one of the directors and shareholders transferred the trade mark owned by Atota Ltd to a separate company, Atota Communications Ltd. Michael White, the co-director of Atota Ltd, made an application to the Registry for rectification of the trade marks register under Section 64. The Hearing Officer allowed the application, as the Form TM16 had been presented without the knowledge of Atota Ltd. Geoffrey Hobbs QC dismissed the appeal by Atota Communications; the grounds for appeal did not put forward any proposition to the effect that the Hearing Officer either misunderstood the facts or made an error in her decision taking reasoning. | O/341/06 Milk Link Ltd v Almighty Marketing Ltd (29.11.06) | MOO JUICE - Milk; milk beverages; flavoured milk; milk products; yoghurt; drinking yoghurt; flavoured yoghurt (29) | Milk Link Ltd appealed the Hearing Officer’s dismissal an application of invalidity under Sections 3(6), 3(1)(b), 3(1)(c) and 3(1)(d). Milk Link Ltd submitted that at the time of the application, MOO JUICE consisted exclusively of a sign or indication which could serve in trade to designate the kind of goods for which registration was requested for the purpose of Section 3(1)(c). In particular, Milk Link Ltd submitted that the Hearing Officer had not given regard to the UK inclination to adopt and use words and expressions from ‘American’ English. Geoffrey Hobbs QC held that the Hearing Officer had been right to dismiss the appeal; although in some areas there is a strong tendency for terminology to migrate from the US to the UK, there is generally considerable scope for the US and UK to be divided by a common language. The quirkiness of MOO JUICE was, from the perspective of the average consumer in the UK, sufficient to individualise such products to a single undertaking. | O/371/06 Four Star Distribution v C&J Clark International Ltd (20.12.06) |  - footwear; boots, shoes, and slippers; parts and fittings (25)
CIRCA - Various articles of clothing (25) | Four Star's application to revoke C & J's CICA marks based on its earlier registered trade mark for CIRCA was rejected by the Hearing Officer at first instance because Four Star had failed to show use of the CIRCA mark within the period of five years preceding the date of the application for invalidity. Four Star appealed and requested permission to allow the admission of fresh evidence. Professor Ruth Annand held that, through no fault of either party, the issue of genuine use in the UK of the CIRCA mark had not been aired at the first instance hearing; the proper course of action would have been for the Hearing Officer to make a request for further information from Four Star. Following the conditions set down in Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489, the Appointed Person allowed some evidence into the appeal and held that there had been genuine use of the CIRCA mark in the UK for some, but not all, of the goods in the specification. The case was remitted to the Registry for determination of Four Star's application for invalidity under Section 5(2)(b) (to be based on the goods for which genuine use in the UK had been established). | O/372/06 Brutt Beteiligungsgesellschaft MBH and others v Target Fixings Limited (20.12.06) | BRUTT HELICAL/ Brutt Helical - (6, 19) BRUTT/Brutt - (6, 19) BRUTT BAR/Brutt Bar - (6) BRUTT BOND/Brutt Bond - (19) | The applicants applied for declarations that each of the marks owned by Target Fixings Ltd was invalidly registered on the grounds they were applied for in bad faith contrary to Section 3(6) and/or were applied for by a person who was an agent or representative of the proprietor of the marks in a Convention country within Section 60(1). The Hearing Officer dismissed the applications and the applicants appealed. Richard Arnold QC reviewed the evidence of the relationship between the applicants and Target Fixings Ltd and held that Target Fixings Ltd's behaviour in applying to register the marks fell short of the standards acceptable commercial behaviour (the parties were engaged in a joint venture at the application date, the applicants did not consent to Target Fixings Ltd applying to register the Marks and it was likely that the proprietor anticipated that the relationship was likely to soon come to an end). The Appointed Person declared that each of the marks was invalidly registered under Section 3(6) and did not need to reach a conclusion under Section 60 (although he noted that the evidence for this section was lacking). |
Deceptive marks Elizabeth Emanuel v Continental Shelf 128 Ltd (Decision of the Appointed Person (Professor Ruth Annand); O-317-06; 03.11.06) Elizabeth Emanuel, the well known dress designer, registered her name as a device trade mark in Class 25 and assigned it to her business, EE Plc. 
The business ran into financial difficulties and was assigned, along with the device mark, to a company eventually known as Continental Shelf 128 Ltd. Elizabeth Emanuel left the employment of this company, but the company continued under the Elizabeth Emanuel name and applied to register the name as a word mark. Elizabeth Emanuel opposed the application and applied to revoke the device mark. The UK Hearing Officer dismissed the opposition and application for revocation, despite his finding of deception and confusion, on the ground that such deception and confusion was “lawful” and the inevitable consequence of the sale of the business and goodwill to the predecessors in title to the current applicant of the mark. On appeal, the Appointed Person, David Kitchin QC (O-17-04) referred a number of questions to the ECJ. In summary he asked whether a trade mark is to be regarded as liable to mislead the public within the meaning of Article 3(1)(g) (prohibition on the registration of deceptive marks) or Article 12(2)(b) (revocation for misleading use) if, for a period following its assignment to the business making the goods to which it relates, the use of the mark in relation to those goods is liable to deceive the public into believing, contrary to the fact, that a particular person has been involved in designing and making those goods. The ECJ held that, although the public interest underlying Article 3(1)(g), namely consumer protection, raised the issues of whether the average consumer would be confused, especially where the person to whose name the mark corresponded originally personified the goods bearing that mark, Article 3(1)(g) required more. It presupposed the existence of actual deceit or a sufficiently serious risk that the consumer would be deceived (Consorzio per la tutela del formaggio Gorgonzola C‑87/97). The same analysis applied to Article 12(2)(b). Although such matters were for the national court to decide, the ECJ stated that, in this case, even if the average consumer were to be influenced into buying garments sold under the mark ELIZABETH EMANUEL by imagining that Elizabeth Emanuel designed them, the characteristics and the qualities of those garments would remain guaranteed by the trade mark owner. Consequently, the name ELIZABETH EMANUEL was not in itself deceptive as to the origin of the goods. At the resumed appeal hearing, Elizabeth Emanuel submitted that the ECJ’s answers were not clear and a further reference to the ECJ might be necessary. Professor Ruth Annand held that the application of the ECJ’s decision in these appeals was not in doubt and dismissed both of Elizabeth Emanuel’s appeals. Colour signs Calor Gas (Northern Ireland) Limited v The Registrar (Decision of the Appointed Person (Mr Geoffrey Hobbs QC); O-340-06; 08.11.06) Calor Gas applied to register the following two signs (filed in black and white) for use in relation to fuel gas in liquid form in class 4: 
The Trade Mark consists of the colour yellow applied to the outer surface of the cylinder within which gas is contained. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Trade Mark consists of the colour yellow applied to the outer surface of a cylinder within which gas is contained. The Registry objected to both the first sign (on the basis that the graphical representation did not show how much of the surface is coloured yellow and in that respect the mark was not graphically represented) and the second sign (on the basis that it contained no accompanying line drawing and the description alone was insufficient as gas cylinders come in varying shapes and sizes) and issued a deficiency notice. Calor Gas agreed to delete the second mark and amend the wording of the first mark to The Trade Mark consists of the colour yellow applied to the whole visible surface of the cylinder within which gas is contained. The Registry waived the deficiency notice and allowed the application to proceed for the first sign with its original filing date. Nearly four years later, the Registry raised the issue that the colour yellow should have been represented in colour or the wording should have provided a specific Pantone reference for the colour. The Registry considered that the addition of a relevant Pantone reference would constitute an acceptable clarification (rather than an amendment) and therefore the application would maintain the original filing date. The Registry suggested the colour sample would be published alongside the cylinder with the wording The trade mark consists of a colour yellow applied to the whole visible surface of the cylinder as shown within which the goods are contained. The applicant has provided the Registrar with a digital image which contains an embedded sRGB colour management profile. The precise colour yellow can be viewed in a controlled environment at the Patent Office. Calor Gas filed references for the colour, however the Registry objected as it considered the colour not close to the pure yellow applied for, but in the orange region. The Registry subsequently filed a second deficiency notice, stating that the application did not meet the requirements of Section 32(2)(d), and invited Calor Gas to remedy the deficiency within an unextendable deadline of two months. The notice also reminded Calor Gas of its right to be heard in respect of that matter. Within the two month deadline, Calor Gas requested a hearing. The Hearing took place more than four months after the unextendable deadline had expired and the Hearing Officer held that the second deficiency notice was valid with the result that the application was deemed never to have been made on expiry of the relevant two month period. Calor Gas appealed to the Appointed Person. Geoffrey Hobbs QC noted that he had doubts as to the legitimacy of conducting a hearing in the Registry for deciding whether the Registrar should or should not confirm the correctness of a decision which he has already made and carried into effect. The Appointed Person concluded that the fair way to proceed would be to treat the appeal as an appeal against the decision to issue the second deficiency notice. The Appointed Person held that the Registrar was correct to regard a representation of colour expressed in terms of a reference being in principle satisfactory for the purpose of fulfilling the requirements for graphic representation. The Appointed person further held that the wording suggested by the Registry was not an appropriate way to fulfil the requirements as it did not give enough information as to the precise identity of the sign. Furthermore, he held that the colour “yellow” is ambiguous and that ambiguity is not removed by coupling it with a sample which would often be considered orange. The Appointed Person held that the original and amplified graphic representations of colour were not clear, precise, self-contained, easily accessible, intelligible, durable, unequivocal and objective to the standard required and dismissed the appeal. Decisions of the CFI and ECJ
Ref no. | Application (and where applicable, earlier mark) | Comment | CFI T-358/04 Georg Neumann GmbH v OHIM (12.09.07) |  - Microphones, in particular studio microphones, condenser microphones, pressure-gradient microphones and their parts (9)
| The CFI upheld the decision of the BoA that a three-dimensional mark in the form of a microphone head grill lacked distinctive character under Article 7(1)(b). The CFI held that the list of products in question covered microphones in general and was not, as submitted by Neumann, limited to studio and other expensive microphones. The relevant public covered a narrow band of people who had a particular knowledge of microphones (including consumers who did not use microphones for professional purposes). Since microphones were goods that were used less frequently and were of higher value than everyday consumer items, there would be an increased level of attention among this group. Following Storck v OHIM C-24/05, the CFI noted that it could be more difficult to establish distinctiveness for 3-D marks rather than word/figurative marks and held that Neumann had failed to establish that the relevant public distinguished products from different manufacturers on the basis of their shape. Regarding the evidence submitted by Neumann as to the design of the shape at issue, the BoA was entitled to hold that consumers could consider the design of the mark as aesthetic while not viewing it as an indication of origin. Accordingly the appeal was dismissed. | CFI T-304/05 Cain Cellars, Inc. v OHIM (12.09.07) Decision not yet in English |  - Wine (33)
| The CFI dismissed the appeal, upholding the BoA’s decision that the mark applied for was devoid of distinctive character under Article 7(1)(b). The CFI held that the mark in question consisted entirely of a conventional geometric figure and was not capable of identifying the commercial origin of the product in question. The CFI considered that the mark was devoid of distinctive character as a consequence of its extremely simple nature. | CFI T-140/06 Philip Morris Products SA v OHIM (12.09.07) Decision not yet in English |
 - cigarette packages (34)
| The CFI dismissed the appeal, upholding the BoA’s decision that the 3D mark applied for was devoid of distinctive character under Article 7(1)(b). The CFI agreed with the BoA that the average consumer would pay little attention to the shape of the cigarette packet and, in the absence of any verbal/figurative element, the mark applied was lacking in intrinsic distinctive character. The fact that there were no other similar shapes on the market was irrelevant as the elements of the mark were only simple stylistic variations on the general shape of cigarette packaging. The CFI agreed with the BoA that the mark applied for, viewed in its entirety, could not be materially differentiated from ordinary shapes of the product in question. | CFI T-141/06 Glaverbel SA v OHIM (12.09.07) | 
- Unworked or semi-worked glass (except glass used in building, glass sheets for use in the manufacture of sanitary installations, showers, refrigerator shelves, glazing, building partitions, doors, furniture and kitchen cutting boards (21) | The CFI dismissed the action, upholding the BoA’s decision to reject the application for registration of a figurative mark consisting of a design applied to the surface of goods. The CFI held that the goods were not intended solely for professionals; choice of the specific design of the glass sheet is determined, to an extent, by the final consumer (even though the sheet would be purchased by the professional). When assessing whether a mark has become distinctive for the purpose of Article 7(3), reference must be made of factors such as the market share held by the mark; how intensive, geographically widespread and long-standing use of the mark has been; the amount invested by the undertaking in promoting the mark; the proportion of the relevant class of persons who, because of the mark, identify goods as originating from a particular undertaking; and professional/industry statements. The CFI held that if, once these factors have been weighed up, a considerable section of the relevant customers identify the goods as originating from the manufacturer of the mark, Article 7(3) is satisfied. Following Eurocermex v OHIM T-299/02, it may be assumed that the assessment for distinctiveness of non-word marks is the same throughout the Community, therefore a non-word mark would have to show distinctiveness in the Community generally to satisfy Article 7(3). If the distinctive character of the mark is not shown in every Member State then Community registration will be refused. | CFI T-164/06 ColArt/Americas, Inc. v OHIM (12.09.07) | BASICS - Paints; varnishes, inks; dyes and other artist materials (2) | The CFI dismissed the appeal under Article 7(1)(c) and 7(3), upholding the BoA decision that the word was descriptive of the goods upon which the word would be found. The CFI held that the target audience would be the general English-speaking public for whom ‘BASICS’ would denote a characteristic of the goods (i.e. an essential fundamental or elementary element) rather than act as a trade mark. It was not relevant to the Community regime that similar words had been registered under national trade mark schemes. It was for the manufacturer to prove that the trade mark had become distinctive to its target audience through use in the Community prior to the date of filing the application for the purpose of Article 7(3). The BoA was correct to find that the documents produced were not capable of demonstrating this. | CFI T-461/04 Imagination Technologies Ltd v OHIM (20.09.07) | PURE DIGITAL - Audiovisual equipment and computing; telecommunication services connected with the use of a computer (9 and 38) | The CFI dismissed the appeal and upheld the decision of the BoA to refuse to register the mark. Digital technology was an essential characteristic of the goods and services in Classes 9 and 38. The addition of the word ‘pure’ reinforced the descriptiveness of the word ‘digital’. Contrary to the applicant’s submission, the words ‘pure digital’ were in compliance with English syntax. The BoA was right to take the view that the sign would be perceived by consumers as an indication of the kind of computer, broadcasting and communication goods and services and not as an indication of origin. The sign was therefore covered by the prohibition in Article 7(1)(c) and necessarily devoid of any distinctive character under 7(1)(b). The BoA could not be criticized for not considering the offer of a disclaimer pursuant to Article 38(2). For that provision to apply, at least one of the elements of the mark must be distinctive. Here, both elements were devoid of any distinctive character. Regarding the applicant’s plea under Article 7(3), according to settled case law, a mark must have become distinctive through use before the application was filed. The applicant could not rely on Article 51(2) in order to challenge this interpretation. That provision was justified by the legitimate expectation of the proprietor of the mark, who may make investments in the period following registration. By contrast, there were no legitimate expectations in relation to a mere application, with the result that there was no need to take account of possible use subsequent to the filing of the application. | CFI T-418/03 La Mer Technology, Inc v OHIM; Laboratoires Goëmar (27.09.07) | LA MER - soaps for the care of the human skin and the human body; perfumery, essential oils, cosmetics, hair lotions; dentifrices, toiletries, including creams, gels and lotions (3) LABORATOIRE DE LA MER - perfumes and cosmetics of a marine product base (3) (national and international marks) | The CFI upheld the BoA’s decision, confirming that there was a likelihood of confusion under Article 8(1)(b) between LA MER and the earlier word mark. The CFI held that sufficient proof of prior genuine use of the earlier mark under Article 43(2) and (3) had been adduced; even minimal use could be deemed sufficient to be genuine. It stated that no blanket de minimis rule could be applied. For the purpose of Article 8(1)(b), the CFI held that the two marks displayed both visual and phonetic similarity; “la mer” was an identical component of both marks. The CFI held that there was a strong conceptual similarity between the two marks attributed to the low distinctiveness of “laboratoire”. The CFI confirmed that some goods were identical and there was a high degree of similarity between the rest, noting that products such as soaps and dentifrices could have both cosmetic and hygienic properties. The CFI upheld the likelihood of confusion on the basis of the cumulative effect of the high degree of similarity between the marks and the goods in question. |
Société des Produits Nestlé SA v OHIM; Quick restaurants SA (ECJ (Third Chamber); C-193/06; 20.09.07) – Decision not yet in English Nestlé applied to register the figurative mark QUICKY set out below as a CTM for a broad range of foods and beverages in classes 29, 30 and 32. 
The Belgian company, Quick restaurants, opposed the application, relying on its earlier registrations in Benelux and France for the word mark QUICKIES in classes 29, 30 and 42. OHIM allowed the opposition under Article 8(1)(b). The CFI dismissed the appeal, holding that the verbal elements of the marks were similar and the figurative element of the figurative mark did not render the verbal elements negligible. Nestlé appealed to the ECJ which upheld the appeal in part and referred the case back to the CFI. The ECJ held that the CFI had not performed a global assessment of the similarity of the marks for the purpose of Article 8(1)(b) (the CFI decided the likelihood of confusion only on the basis of the verbal element). The ECJ confirmed that it was only when all other elements of a complex mark were negligible that the comparison could be made solely on the basis of a dominant element. The fact that an element was not negligible did not necessarily mean that it was dominant, and vice versa. Figurative Marks Koipe Corporación SL v OHIM; Aceites de | |
